



**SICHERHEITS
KULTUR
IM WANDEL**



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**Bericht der Sektion
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Herausgegeben vom Projekt

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EINLEITUNG

Im Rahmen des Projekts Sicherheitskultur im Wandel wurde bei der SGIR (Standing Group on International Relations) Konferenz, 9.-11. September 2010 in Stockholm, Schweden, eine thematische Sektion organisiert. Die SGIR ist eine Arbeitsgruppe innerhalb des European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), des größten Dachverbandes für politikwissenschaftliche Institutionen in Europa, und veranstaltet alle drei Jahre eine der wichtigsten internationalen Konferenzen über die aktuellen Probleme der internationalen Politik. Die Sektion, geleitet von Christopher Daase und Georgios Kolliarakis, trug den Titel **„The Transformation of Security Culture“** und setzte sich aus sieben Konferenzpanels zusammen (s. unten für die detaillierten Beschreibungen des Sektionsdachthemas sowie der Panelthemen und den entsprechend präsentierten Papieren).

Die Organisation der Sektion diene zwei Zielen des Projekts: Erstens eine neue Forschungsagenda in einem internationalem Forum mit beachtlichem Einfluss zu setzen sowie durch ausgewählte Beiträge von prominenten WissenschaftlerInnen Impulse von außen zu bekommen, die zur Weitergestaltung der Projektzusammenarbeit beitragen. Zweitens, diene die Präsenz des Projekts bei der SGIR Konferenz dazu, sich international mit Wissenschaftlern zu vernetzen, die über sicherheitspolitische Themen forschen, sowie die laufenden Projektaktivitäten einem breiteren Publikum bekannt zu machen.

Inhaltlich gesehen wurde die im Projekt gesetzte Problematik in vielerlei Hinsicht vorangetrieben. Die Panelthemen reichten von dem sich verändernden Stil der Kooperation zwischen internationalen Organisationen sowie der neuen Kapazität von Nichtregierungsorganisationen die sicherheitspolitische Agenda zu beeinflussen, bis zu den positiven und negativen Nebeneffekten von aktuellen Trends der Sicherheitspolitik wie z.B. der Versuche „Human Security“ zu implementieren oder informelle Clubs wie G8 zu etablieren. Nicht zuletzt lassen sich solche Trends an den Reaktionen über die neuen Sicherheitstechnologien im öffentlichen Raum erkennen sowie an der visuellen Repräsentationen in der Populärkultur beobachten.

Im zweiten Abschnitt des ersten Teils wird das allgemeine Thema der Sektion skizziert und die Diskussionen in den sieben Panels zusammengefasst. Im zweiten Teil dieses Berichts sind die ausführlichen Beschreibungen der Panels sowie die Abstracts der präsentierten Papiere zu finden.

BERICHT AUS DEN PANELS UND VORTRÄGEN

Das erste Panel (36-1: **Transnational Networks and the Provision of Peace and Security: The Functioning and Effects of Transnational Security Networks**) hatte zum Thema „Netzwerke“, sowohl als analytischen Rahmen als auch als reale Organisationsform. Die empirischen Beispiele, von globalen Policynetzwerken, EU-Konsultationsgremien bis zu Koordination und Kollaboration von Institutionen in post-conflict Peacebuilding, zeigen die Dynamik dieser Entwicklung, die noch weitgehend undokumentiert ist. Offene Forschungsfragen sind u.a., wie Macht innerhalb von Netzwerken neu konzeptualisiert und praktiziert wird, und ob es signifikante Unterschiede bei der Effektivität und Effizienz netzwerkartigen Organisationen im Vergleich zu hierarchisch organisierten Institutionen gibt. Des Weiteren wurde das Thema der Organisationen als Netzwerke und der Organisationen in Netzwerken besprochen und mit anderen existierenden Ansätzen verglichen, wie z.B. mit dem Ansatz der „epistemic communities“ bezüglich ihrer Kohäsion, Grenzen und Organisationsmodi. Die zentrale These des Panels lag darin, dass die Entstehung und Diffusion transnationaler Sicherheitsnetzwerke sich auf den aktuellen und zukünftigen Charakter der Sicherheitskultur auswirken.

Das zweite Panel (36-2: **The Weakness of Strong Security Institutions**) hatte die Form einer Roundtable-Diskussion mit eingeladenen ExpertenInnen über die Thematik des Wandels der Sicherheitsinstitutionen. Der Titel des Panels „Die Schwäche von starken Sicherheitsinstitutionen“ deutete die komplementäre These von der „Stärke von schwachen Sicherheitsinstitutionen“ an und sprach dadurch einen wichtigen Aspekt des Wandels der Sicherheitskultur an. Zunächst wurde die Spannung zwischen Formalität und Informalität kontrovers diskutiert. Einerseits sei eine Mischung von Formalität und Informalität in der Organisation und Funktionsweise von internationalen Institutionen mit unterschiedlichen Nebeneffekten vorhanden, wie z.B. Flexibilität und Anpassungsfähigkeit auf Kosten von Legitimität und Stabilität. Andererseits können Formalität und Informalität, genauso wie Inklusion und Exklusion, in zeitlichen Zyklen den Charakter der internationalen Institutionen bestimmen. Dies sei eine Folge von Anpassungsdynamiken an eine wechselnde Problemumwelt. Daher ist die Trendabschätzung ein spannendes Thema. Es werden eine Proliferation und Fragmentierung von Sicherheitsinstitutionen registriert, die von formalen Organisationen bis zu informellen „No-Name“ Clubs reichen. Die Ambivalenz dieser Entwicklung besteht darin, dass einerseits die sicherheitspolitische Agenda erweitert wird, andererseits eine Diffusion von Haftung und Verantwortung stattfindet. Wenn Sicherheitskultur die Gesamtheit dieser Trends ist, dann stellt sich die Frage nach den Ursa-

chen, aber auch umgekehrt, nach den Folgen des Kulturwandels. Welches ist ihr „Ordnungseffekt“ auf die Politik und wie beeinflusst wiederum die Politik das Verständnis davon, was eine „Bedrohung“ ist? Zum Schluss wurde das Thema von „forward-looking“ versus „backward-looking“ Designs von Institutionen zur Behandlung von bestehenden Problemen (reaktives Handeln) und zur Antizipation von zukünftigen Problemen (proaktives Handeln), kommentiert.

Das dritte Panel (36-3: **Human Securitization, Executive Politics, and Governmentality**) problematisierte das Konzept und die Praxis von „Human Security“ (HS) seit Mitte der 1990er Jahren. Einerseits hat das Konzept der HS viele alltagsrelevante Aspekte der Sicherheit der Bürger einbezogen, andererseits hat es die Ansprüche an den Staat dramatisch erhöht. Diese Entwicklung hat bereits die Grenzen der Handlungskapazität und die Grenzen der Konsensfähigkeit darüber aufgezeigt, was als schützenswert gilt und was nicht. Die Inflation an sicherheitsbezogenen Themen generiert neue Konflikte über die Priorisierung und Finanzierung von Initiativen sowie über die Selektion der Betroffenen und die Zuständigkeiten der Entscheidungsträger. Eine Schlüsselrolle beim Agenda-setting spielen dabei nationale und internationale Nichtregierungsorganisationen, die das staatliche Definitionsmonopol herausfordern. Eine weitere Folge des Trends in Richtung HS ist, dass „Safety“-Themen zunehmend zu Gegenständen von „Security“-Überlegungen avanciert werden. Die qualitative Veränderung zusammen mit der quantitativen Zunahme an sicherheitsrelevanten Themen bewirken momentan einen methodischen Wandel weg vom „Gefahren“-Kalkül hin zum „Risiko“-Denken. Dies findet Ausdruck beim Design von Strategien wie Prävention, Vorbereitung, Kompensation, etc. Eine weitere relevante Dimension ist die der involvierten Akteure, die als „epistemic communities“ betrachtet und analysiert werden können. Dadurch bekommt man Einsichten in die unterschiedliche Motivations- und Interessenlage von Experten, Stakeholdern und Policymakern, sowie in ihre divergierende Ressourcenlage und Ziele.

Das vierte Panel (36-4: **Security, the West and the Rest? The Transformation of Security Cultures and its Consequences**) beschäftigte sich mit dem Wandel innerhalb des „Westens“ als imaginierte Kulturgemeinschaft. Zwei Dimensionen des Problems seien einerseits der Westen als versicherheitlichende (securitizing) Gemeinschaft und andererseits der Westen als versicherheitlichte (securitized) Gemeinschaft. Diese Prozesse sind nicht voneinander abgekoppelt und zielen darauf ab, die liberalen Affluenzgesellschaften in Europa und Nordamerika auf neuartige Risiken zu sensibilisieren und Ressourcen für einen besseren Schutz der Bürger zu mobilisieren. Nichtsdestotrotz ist eine Ausweitung umstrittener An-

sprüche von unterschiedlichen Akteuren zu bemerken, welche miteinander oft nicht kompatibel sind und sogar konträr zueinander laufen. Die Beispiele der transatlantischen Beziehungen sowie des divergierenden Stils der Außenpolitik der USA und der EU zeigen des Weiteren die normativen Implikationen von Versicherunglichungsakten, die nicht nur auf der diskursiven Ebene bleiben, sondern policy-bezogene Effekte entfalten. Methodisch gesehen ist neben der Dokumentation staatlicher Außenpolitik die Populärkultur, z.B. Kinofilme, ein zunehmend wichtiges Barometer der Akzeptanz oder Ablehnung der herrschenden Sicherheitskultur.

Das fünfte Panel (36-5: **Changing Coalitions and Practices in a New Security Environment**) konzentrierte sich auf die sicherheitspolitisch relevante Einmischung von privaten Akteuren in den letzten Jahren und unternahm den Versuch, Folgen für die Sicherheitskultur zu ermitteln. Die Zusammenarbeit mit nicht-staatlichen Akteuren bei der Kriminalitäts- und Terrorismusbekämpfung ist eine solche Entwicklung, die oft Effizienz- und Effektivitätsprobleme auf Kosten von Transparenz und Verantwortung/Haftung löst. Die Abwägung von Vor- und Nachteilen bei solchen Koalitionen kann besser anhand eines risiko-basierten Ansatzes untersucht werden. Dabei müssten die organisationellen und operativen Aspekte von Finanz- und Sicherheitsinstitutionen berücksichtigt werden, um traditionelle Instrumente wie Abschreckung neu zu bewerten. Ein zentraler Punkt ist dabei, dass solche Praktiken sowohl absichtlich als auch unabsichtlich einen Kulturwandel herbeiführen, indem sie neue Definitionen von Bedrohungen setzen und neue Akteure sowie Sicherheitspraktiken etablieren und legitimieren.

Im sechsten Panel (36-6: **Of Chickens and Eggs: Regions as Creators and Subjects of International Norms**) wurde nach den Definitionskriterien („Benchmarks“) von Sicherheitskultur in Bezug auf die traditionellen, neorealistischen Faktoren der strategischen Kultur gefragt. In dieser Hinsicht wurde auf die Rolle der Populärkultur als Determinante einer Sicherheitsgemeinschaft („Security Community“) hingewiesen. Aus organisationskultureller Sicht können regionale Organisationen wie ASEAN oder UNASUR nach Modi operieren, die weniger rechtlich strukturiert und weniger formell sind als die des Westens. Dementsprechend kann eine Mischung aus Kulturmerkmalen und Organisationsmerkmalen Auskunft über das zu erwartende Verhalten in krisenhaften Situationen geben („souveränitätssensitiv“; „face-saving“; „conflict-avoidant“; „kompromiss-suchend“; etc.). Von großem Interesse ist in dieser Hinsicht, wie globale Normen wie z.B. die UNO vorgeschriebene „Responsibility to Protect“, im lokalen Kontext der ESDP aufgenommen, angepasst und angewandt werden. Zum Schluss wurde das Verhältnis zwischen Sicherheitspolitik und

Sicherheitskultur und die Rolle von Versicherheitlichungsakten diskutiert.

Das siebte Panel (36-7: **A Question of Socio-cultural Context: Security Culture(s), Audiences and the Acceptance of Security Measures in Public Space**) fokussierte auf das Spannungsfeld zwischen der Standardisierung aktueller Sicherheitsmaßnahmen, wie z.B. elektronischer Überwachungssystemen im öffentlichen Raum, Körperscanner an Flughäfen, biometrischen Datensammlungen usw. und ihrer Rezeption in unterschiedlichen Gesellschaften in Europa. So ruft beispielsweise die Omnipräsenz von Kameras im öffentlichen Raum in der traditionell liberalen britischen Gesellschaft kaum skeptische Reaktionen hervor, während die Installation weniger Kameras in Griechenland massive Opposition provozierte. Die Differenzen bei der Toleranz und Akzeptanz solcher Maßnahmen sollen nicht nur institutionell, sondern vielmehr historisch und kulturell verstanden und erklärt werden. Die Bereitschaft einer Gesellschaft, rechtliche Instrumente einzusetzen und neue Technologien zu entwickeln, um die Sicherheit der Bürger zu garantieren, muss in einem zeitlichen und räumlichen Kontext betrachtet werden. Nur dann können die divergierenden Mischungen von individueller Freiheit und kollektiver Einschränkung in den europäischen Gesellschaften hinreichend analysiert werden. Wie Bedrohungen, aber auch wie die Gegenmaßnahmen perzipiert, entworfen und implementiert werden, sind noch kaum erforschte Indikatoren der Sicherheitskultur einer Gesellschaft, die Kontroversen über Werte und Normen zum Ausdruck bringen.

BESCHREIBUNG DER PANELS UND VORTRÄGE

Section 36: The Transformation of Security Culture

Convenors	Georgios Kolliarakis	University of Frankfurt/Main
	Christopher Daase	University of Frankfurt/Main

Security has advanced from a state-centred concept to a core notion of contemporary western societies. The widening of the scope of security has brought many important issues to light but it seems to stretch national and international institutions beyond their capacities. This development may seriously undermine the credibility, the reliability, as well as the legitimacy of these institutions. This SGIR section is conceived around a series of developments which bring about profound change in security policy culture/s. As security culture we understand the set of beliefs, norms, and practices of individuals and organizations which shape the way they diagnose a problem and decide on the appropriate therapy.

There is currently an increasing discrepancy between the inflation in domestic as well as international commitments (e.g. peacekeeping and statebuilding missions, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, long term risks such as climate change, etc.) on the one hand, and the actual capability of states to live up to them on the other. Besides that, there is a trend to resort to more informal arrangements with selected states or even with non-state actors, bypassing the established formal international institutions and the transparent procedures within them, which may compensate bureaucratic inertia and ineffectiveness at the cost of legitimacy and accountability of security policy. Moreover, the introduction of new security technologies in the public and private spheres seems to clash with long held principles and civil liberties. Last, together with the changing geopolitical position of Europe comes the claim of new states and non-state actors outside the West to shape the global game. This is bound to influence not only the outcome of international negotiations, but most probably also the rules of the security game itself.

The process of modification, selective violation, or permanent abolishment of international norms is the result of recent developments in international affairs, and, at the same time, it sets the context for future security policy. This section seeks to document trends in the current international security landscape, trace down when, how, and why security culture/s get transformed, as well as assess their impact for conflict management and security governance. At the same time the section aspires to explore a promising social scientific research agenda, with theoretical models and methodologies more sensitive to both the macro- as

well as micropolitics of security affairs. Panel and paper proposals focusing on the changing role of international organizations, on the influence of principles such as the “responsibility to protect” upon international intervention and sanctions, on norms, practices and consequences of proactive security policy, and especially on transnational risks and the discourse behind them, are most welcome to enrich our section.

Panel 36-1: Transnational Networks and the Provision of Peace and Security: The Functioning and Effects of Transnational Security Networks

Chair(s)	Oliver Westerwinter	European University Institute
Discussant(s)	Jessica F Green	Princeton University
	Christian Bueger	Institute for Development and Peace

Institute for Development and Peace During the last two decades we have witnessed a profound transformation of the provision and maintenance of international peace and security. Public and private actors across different countries and at multiple levels engage increasingly in networked forms of cooperation in order to pool their resources, align their activities and combat complex transnational security threats. Such networked forms of security policy-making and implementation are part of an emergent system of transnational security governance. What is more, networks are not only a new form of cooperation in the security area, they also introduce a new paradigm or rationale into existing security cultures which profoundly alters the way security policy-making and implementation is understood and conducted. This network-paradigm of security governance centers around a certain set of beliefs, rules and practices which contains among others mutual dependency, flexibility, inclusiveness, deliberation and horizontal organization. Although there has been an evolving branch of International Relations literature on transnational networks in the security area, our empirical and theoretical knowledge on the functioning and effects of those networks is still very limited.

This panel builds upon this research gap by addressing the following questions: How does the provision of peace and security proceed within transnational networks? How far does networked security politics differ from multilateral forms of security governance? What are the constitutive and causal effects of transnational security networks both on network members as well as on security policy-making and implementation at the network level and beyond? More specifically, how far do security networks affect the policies and activities of their members and how far does the emergence of networked security politics contribute to

a transformation of the security culture of the international system in general? What are the constitutive and causal mechanisms through which networks generate effects and what factors do account for variations in those effects? Finally, what role does power play in networked security politics?

The panel suggests analyzing these questions by combining the theoretical concepts and methodological techniques of network theory and network analysis with conceptual frameworks of International Relations theories. It maintains that this integration of different research fields permits to advance the analysis of the functioning and effects of transnational security networks. In particular, it allows for examining the multi-faceted processes through which the social structures of networks are shaped by as well as translate into network discourses, practices and outcomes.

The panel brings together papers that study the functioning and effects of a broad range of transnational security networks at different levels. The contributing papers focus on networks-as-agents or networks-as-structures or both or develop alternative perspectives for examining security networks. They provide accurate descriptions and/or rigorous and innovative theoretical analyses of the functioning and consequences of transnational security networks. Methodologically, the contributions to the panel draw on quantitative and qualitative approaches to the study of networks. This theoretical and methodological diversity bears the potential for further elucidating the complex interrelations between network structures, practices and agency and the constitutive and causal mechanisms through which these interrelating factors shape the functioning and effects of networked security politics and its contributions to the transformation of existing security cultures. In sum, the collective effort of the contributions to this panel will provide stimulating new insights for making further progress towards theorizing the role of networks in transnational security governance as well as in the ongoing change of security cultures.

Papers

Policy Networks in Comparative Politics and International Relations: Comparing Analytical Perspectives, Concepts and Methods

Anja P. Jakobi, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK)

Abstract: In this paper, existing approaches to network analysis in comparative politics and International Relations (IR) are reviewed and compared. While comparative politics dealt with policy networks and its implications already in the 1990s, IR has only recently turned

to this subject. Most prominently, networks have been emphasized as ‘global policy networks’ (Reinicke) or ‘transgovernmental networks’ (Slaughter), both concepts that—compared to ideas in comparative politics—embody a very restricted understanding of policy networks. This paper argues that the theoretical and empirical exploration of networks in current IR research could benefit from systematically taking into account the literature that has emerged in comparative politics. For this purpose, three aspects of research linked to networks are compared, namely a) the analytical and functional perspectives from which networks are examined, b) the typologies of networks developed, as well as c) the methods applied for their inquiry. For example, with regard to analytical perspectives, comparative politics has offered a variety of possible contributions of networks in the political process. Additionally, comparative research has presented different types of networks, and network analyses have been carried out with both qualitative as well as quantitative methods. In all these aspects, IR can learn from earlier approaches. The paper concludes by outlining three areas that are likely to enrich future IR research on networks: interest representation and power in global networks, typologies of global policy networks, and quantitative and comparative methods linked to their inquiry.

Being in Between: Brokerage as Source of Influence in Peacebuilding Strategy-Making

Oliver Westerwinter, European University Institute, Florence

Abstract: During the last two decades we have witnessed fundamental changes of United Nations peace operations. In contrast to traditional peacekeeping, integrated peacebuilding relies on a multiplicity of public and private actors operating at different levels. These actors build transnational networks in which they pool resources and coordinate activities in order to avoid a post-conflict country’s relapse into violent conflict. We still know very little about such peacebuilding networks and particularly their effects on network members and the way they conceptualize and conduct post-conflict peacebuilding. The paper seeks to address this research gap by focusing on one specific dimension of networked peacebuilding namely the formation, diffusion and change of knowledge and normative understandings within networks of peacebuilders. It poses the following questions: *Does knowledge diffusion and normative change occur within networked forms of peacebuilding; and how far does it affect policy-making and implementation in those settings?* Drawing on network and international relations theories, the paper argues that one may observe different types of knowledge diffusion and normative change in peacebuilding networks. These processes affect particularly the policy-making part of peacebuilding through various channels that rely

on specific interplays between the structures, practices and agency of peacebuilding networks. The paper illustrates this argument by drawing on empirical evidence from peacebuilding in Burundi, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau.

Network Governance and European Security

Mai'a K Cross, University of Southern California

Abstract: One of the critical questions of the moment, and certainly into the future, regarding the viability of the European Union, is whether it will become a credible security actor with the ability, not only to protect its common borders, but also to contribute to global security. Many scholars have cast doubt upon the prospects, pointing out that the EU has yet to accomplish political and security integration of any significance. These scholars often argue that when it comes to security, instead of striving for new levels of integration, EU member-states jealously guard national sovereignty, pursue strongly held national interests, and are only willing to bargain with each other, resulting in lowest common denominator outcomes. I advance a unique argument that transnational networks of experts in Europe have to some extent superseded national governments in the diplomacy of security decision-making. These knowledge-based networks, or “epistemic communities”, are at the heart of the process of security integration, making headway at a remarkable speed by virtue of their members’ shared expertise, common culture, professional norms, and meeting frequency. Altogether, these qualities determine an epistemic community’s ability to effectively persuade member-states of their policy goals. Specifically, this paper compares the Civilian Crisis Management Committee and the EU Military Committee (EUMC) to explain how and why committees influence European Security and Defense Policy missions and operations.

Transgovernmental Security Cooperation

Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, University of Cambridge

Abstract: A growing strand of IR literature focuses on documenting and analyzing the proliferation of cross-border networks among national officials—so-called ‘transgovernmental networks’ (TGNs). Based on direct links among sub-state officials and operating without close control or supervision by cabinets or chief executives, TGNs are credited with being faster, cheaper and more flexible than conventional intergovernmental treaty organizations (IGOs). So far, research has focused predominantly on transgovernmental cooperation in areas such as international finance, securities regulation, and data privacy protection. A common contention in the literature is that the more technically complex the issue-area,

the more leverage national and international bureaucracies can be expected to have. By contrast, bureaucratic actors are expected to play a limited role in issue-areas that touch upon state security. This assumption, I suggest, is at best anachronistic. Many security issues—such as antiterrorism and non-proliferation—are today governed by TGNs operating either within or alongside existing IGOs. TGNs are not evenly distributed, either in terms of geography or issue-area. While some policy-areas are characterized by networked cooperation, others continue to be dominated by more formal IGO-based cooperation. I offer a theoretical explanation for why and under what conditions states might prefer to conduct security policy through TGNs rather than IGOs. Examining the functional advantages of TGNs provides a starting point for understanding variation in their manifestation. The informal and non-binding nature of transgovernmental agreements makes them faster and cheaper to agree on and to implement, and easy to adapt and reverse. Hence, TGNs are ideal conduits for collaboration when speed is a priority and/or when flexibility is highly priced, due, say, to unpredictable or conflicting demands from domestic constituents. Yet, their non-binding nature and lack of enforcement makes TGNs less suitable for cooperation in situations characterized by time-inconsistency or where states have strong incentives to defect. Functional logic, however, provides only part of the answer to when and why states rely on TGN-based cooperation. Another key variable is power. TGNs in security are commonly sponsored by a few powerful states that use a combination of building ‘coalitions-of-the-willing’ and excluding and withholding benefits from outsiders to effectively impose their preferred solutions on others. As such, they resemble instances of ‘coercive cooperation’. I evaluate my conjectures against evidence from two case studies; the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Proliferation Security Initiative. This is complemented by a quantitative study of ten further security-oriented TGNs formed between 1980 and today.

Panel 36-2: The Weakness of Strong Security Institutions

Chair(s)	Christopher Daase	University of Frankfurt/Main
Discussant(s)	Georgios Kolliarakis	University of Frankfurt/Main

Traditionally, security policy has been an issue area characterized by formal treaties (e.g. START, NPT etc.) and highly institutionalized organizations (e.g. NATO, UN). The move from bipolarity to multipolarity and the rise of new security risks and challenges seem to require more flexible and inclusive institutional forms. The old institutional structure is persistent and still legitimate despite enormous deficits in effectiveness and efficiency. This is probably why informal forums are increasingly used to explore new modes of security governance.

Informalization is the tendency of state and non-state actors to engage in collective action on the basis of flexible coalitions, bypassing traditional international institutions or compromising legal obligations by substituting them for less binding arrangements. However, informalization offers not only opportunities, but also entails risks. The opportunity is to adapt to new political circumstances, challenges and crises more promptly, and to include new emerging powers and stakeholders into the international governance structure. The risk is to sidestep more formal traditional institutions (like the UN) and to undermine established practices of international cooperation drifting toward less transparent and legitimate procedures. This round table aims at discussing the weakness of established formal institutions as well as at exploring both potential strengths and weaknesses of new informal ones.

Roundtable Participants

Participants	Harald Mueller	Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK)
	Eyal Benvenisti	Tel Aviv University
	Tanja Brühl	University of Frankfurt/Main
	Gunther Hellmann	University of Frankfurt/Main
	J.Peter Burgess	University of Oslo, PRIO

Panel 36-3: Human Securitization, Executive Politics, and Governmentality

Chair(s)	Andreas Vasilache	University of Bielefeld
Discussant(s)	Andreas Vasilache	University of Bielefeld

The human security doctrine aims at a conceptual and material widening of the notion of security. It transcends the traditional distinction between domestic and international security, broadens the scope of security from its focus on one sector (sector of organized political violence, i.e. the police and military) towards many different policy areas (health, education, environment, etc.), and aims directly at the individual as addressee of security efforts. Taking into account and acknowledging that today, on the one hand, different problems, challenges, and entire policy fields (social justice and welfare, environment, education, etc.), may have security implications and/or, on the other hand, that these problems directly challenge the possibilities of a dignified life of individuals and groups, the concept of human security aims at reaching a situation “free from fear” by broadening the scope of security in both conceptual and empirical terms. While the human security concept has its roots in development discourses, within the past years, it has become quite influential in IR and thus demands careful discussion within this discipline, too.

However, the main aim of the panel consists in a critical reconsideration of the human security concept. In addition, or even in contrast to the critique of its idealistic implications (Buzan) or the supposed “unpractical utopianism” often brought forward against the human security concept, the panel aims at looking at the shortcomings, and in particular at possible normative shortcomings of this highly normative concept. These shortcomings seem to mainly consist in a securitization and executive deformation of politics in general. Although they might be unintentional, they, however, in parts – or in particular world-regions – might counteract and undermine the declared normative targets (and possible advantages) of the human security concept. In particular, the universalist claim and the boundless conceptual structure of the human security notion seem to need critical reconsideration – or maybe even to be contrasted with an idea of *freedom from security*.

As the topic of this panel is rather broad, papers dealing with human security and its possible shortcomings from both a rather theoretical perspective (referring, for instance, to the conceptual logics of the separation of powers in state theory (regardless of the IR school of thought), current governmentality studies, discourse analyses, constructivist approaches, etc.) and from a rather empirical perspective (looking, for example, at the interrelation/hierarchy/collision of different norms, targets, or claims in international politics and within the human security concept, the problem of implementation, institutionalization and/or operationalization, etc.) are highly welcome. Although the aim of this panel is to take a critical (normative) look at human security, papers arguing in favour of the concept are – of course – also much desired.

Papers

The Dilemma of Positive Peace: Analyzing Changing Perceptions of Security

Christoph Schuck, University of Dortmund, Germany

Abstract: The sudden end of the cold war presented new challenges to the academic debate on security. In 1993 Robert O. Keohane concluded that International Relations theory had got caught in a “double dialectic” – not only because the collapse of the Soviet Union had “overtaken the academic debate” but also because the end of the familiar bipolar security architecture had created a gap between theory and practice (Keohane 1993: 296-7). Twenty years after the collapse of the bipolar world structure, this paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of changing perceptions of security, giving particular consideration to three aspects: First, it will be seen that the perception of security has changed more than the

issue of security in itself. However, this changed perception has influenced theoretical aspects of the security debate and has had practical consequences for the political decision-making process: Negative concepts of peace, which equate security with the security of the state, were portrayed as an old-fashioned relict of the cold war. In contrast, "human security" issues (although anything but new) reflect what can be referred to as the enlightened spirit of high morality outlined by Western states and international organizations such as the UN in the 21st century. Second, it will be argued that the changing perception of security indicates a change in the factors which are believed to generate security. Before 1990 two specific ideologies, Marxism and Liberalism, were considered to be the preconditions for peace and security. After what Huntington calls the "grand failure" of communism (Huntington 1991: 27), Immanuel Kant's elaborations on "Perpetual Peace" were re-discovered and it was hoped that democracies - or republican systems in Kant's terminology - would tend to behave peacefully. Not only was democracy, the "final form of government" (Fukuyama 1992), suitable for transfer to any part of the world but it was a global strategy for peace. However, in view of the immense difficulties encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan, the justification for attempts to implement democracy from the outside is increasingly being questioned. Today, it seems that human security approaches may have moved into the conceptual centre of peace strategies. Third, this paper argues that the concept of human security makes such high normative demands on those who claim to be committed to it that they are constantly in danger of failing to suit their actions to their words. This makes it imperative to explore alternatives to "morality" as the driving force for security.

The Discourse on Security – A Comparative Analysis. TV-Newscasts and the Diffusion of Perspectives in the United States of America and Germany

Christian Miess

Abstract: The study of diffusion has become a major field in comparative political science. I argue that in the field of security policy another challenge can be found in a diffusion of perspectives. The design of this thesis is to test if diffusion can be observed through TV evening news in two democracies. To this matter I rely on transcripts of TV newscasts from the USA and Germany. The process of securitization will be applied for the explanation of diffusion. The focus is put on security measures such as secret wiretapping and online searches (spyware), respectively. This research design allows inferences on securitization in TV discourses in two countries which, regarding similar security measures, follow the same line of arguments legitimizing the cutback on civil liberties. It will be shown that securitization in

both countries varies in strength and amount. Nevertheless, clear evidence of a diffusion of perspectives can be observed. This further indicates a medium transnationalization of the TV discourse over the cutback on civil liberties in the war on terror.

Debunking the Myths of Human Security

David Bosold, German Council on Foreign Relations

Abstract: The recent decade has seen an inflationary increase in the scholarship on human security. Most notably, this has been the case in the field of undergraduate textbooks which now mostly feature a chapter on human security. Such a move towards the academic mainstream has been related to the silencing of a number of the concept's critics and the emergence of myths and sedimented truths which shape the current academic human security discourse. These canonical texts encompass, among others, the 'official' history of human security as one being rooted in the 1994 UNDP report, the supposedly benign character of human security as a security paradigm that challenges the concept of national security and the debate on the definition of the term. The latter is closely linked to the distinction between 'freedom from fear' and 'freedom from want'. Drawing on the example of Canada and primary sources (interviews, unreleased ministerial documents) I argue that all three myths have been detrimental to move the academic debate forward and are, in addition, insufficient to fully grasp the transformations that have been associated with the shift to 'human security'. This is, firstly, because the myth of 1994 as an 'annus mirabilis' has distracted scholars from coming to grips with the ruptures and discontinuities in the run-up to the report's publication and the myriad of human security conceptions that began to emerge in the UN at the beginning of the 1990s. Secondly, most scholars seem to have been blinded by the dovish rhetoric of most human security reports and therefore failed to acknowledge that the new semantics has mostly been linked to established military practices, most notably in the debate on R2P and the preceding so-called 'human security bombing' in Kosovo. Such a shift to what is now often referred to as the 'freedom from fear' doctrine has in fact been deeply embedded in Canada's national security culture and Cold war practices and therefore embodies a good deal of continuity. I therefore argue, that a more profound understanding of human security needs to move beyond the 'trompe l'œil' of locating the concept's primary impact at the level of global governance. Whereas changes at the global level associated with human security have been negligible – besides the 'ear candy' of UN resolutions – foreign policy development and implementation (not security policy!) in a domestic context has been transformed profoundly. By probing into the Canadian and the Japanese

case, I will make the case that the key to a broader understanding of human security is, perhaps surprisingly, a comparative foreign policy analysis and less the umpteenth study on its universalist nature.

The Grand Tour Revisited: Identity, Borders, and Order in Millennial Europe

Stephanie Buus, Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Abstract: Although international tourism declined somewhat in 2009 in the wake of the global financial crisis and fears of an H1N1 flu pandemic, it remains a booming business in much of the world. In 2008, there were 922 million international arrivals, generating a tourism receipt total of US\$ 1.1 trillion, or over US\$ 3 billion a day (UNWTO World Tourism Barometer, June 2009). As statistics show and scholars argue, tourism is a thriving global industry with the power and scope to re-shape not only the economic character of every country it touches, but also the cultural, social, and political character of these countries. Interestingly enough, events that would seem to highlight the perils involved in travel—September 11th and the Madrid bombings, the war in Iraq, the emergence of “new diseases” like Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and the H1N1 flu, and the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia—have had surprisingly little impact on the vitality and appeal of travel to foreign places. The aim of this paper is to examine the development of tourism as concept and practice in the EU with an eye to the ideological as well as instrumental significance of tourism and the tourism sector in the ongoing process of EU identity formation and emerging EU security practices. What does it mean and what does it take to move—to travel—between EU and non-EU states according to the Tourism Unit of Directorate General Enterprise and other European bodies working to secure the relationship between the EU and the traveler? Is there one particular model of tourism advocated by the EU, and if so, what might this model suggest about the nature of borders and order in millennial Europe?

Widened Security, Expanding Community? On the Development of EU Civil Protection as an Emerging Community of Practice

Niklas Bremberg, Stockholm University

Abstract: The recent ‘practice turn’ in the social sciences has meant that an increasing number of scholars working in the field of IR have turned their attention to the ways in which ‘practical knowledge’, ‘ways-of-doings-things’ and ‘background dispositions’ inform the interaction of states, also in the field of international security (cf. Neumann 2002). This move seems to have been particularly fruitful in order to analyze the evolution and spread of se-

curity communities by way of ‘communities of practice’ (cf. Adler 2005, 2008, Pouliot 2010). However, if we focus only on the classical puzzle of security communities, i.e. posing the questions of why, how and when states develop ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’, we run the risk of losing sight of security dynamics that might have a military component although they do not necessarily appertain to the problem of inter-state wars and conflicts. This is especially problematic in the post-Cold War era in which the security agenda of states has widened and, at least in Europe, nowadays focuses more explicitly on transboundary risks and non-military threats (such as, for example, terrorism, organized crime, failed states, pandemics, climate change and natural/man-made disasters). This paper picks up on this theme and advances the argument that the European security community should not only be understood as fostering ‘dependable expectations of peaceful change’ based upon a collective identity and a habitus of self-restraint among its members, but it should also be seen as a community of practice bringing together transgovernmental networks of security practitioners. Importantly, such a community goes beyond the institutional boundaries of international organizations, such as the EU, at the same time as it transcends the internal/external security divide in terms of functional and geographical overlaps. The argument in this paper is pursued by way of presenting a case study of the development of EU civil protection.

Panel 36-4: Security, the West and the Rest? The Transformation of Security Cultures and its Consequences

Chair(s)	Gabi Schlag	University of Frankfurt/Main
Discussant(s)	Daniel Nexon	Georgetown University

Security” remains one of the central concepts of academic and practical dispute. Security is perceived by many scholars as being too important to be left to ordinary people due to the extraordinary measures which can be justified by invoking threats and risks. In recent years, however, critical security studies have questioned these common prejudices of taking the meaning an normative value of security for granted instead of reconstructing security practices and their consequences. Our panel will bring together a range of heterodox perspectives on the politics of security discussing conceptual as well as empirical aspects. How can we grasp transformations in the conceptions of security in Europe and North America? Does it make sense to speak of one “Western” security culture (any longer)? And, how could we approach such politics of security from alternative, probably non-Western perspectives?

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A Conceptualisation of Change in the Security Culture of the North Atlantic Security Community: A European Alternative?

Niels Lachmann, Université de Montréal

Abstract: This paper focuses on the difficulties involved in grasping cultural change in international security. This is shown notably by the difficulties that IR scholars drawing upon anthropological conceptions, notably those of Clifford Geertz, have had to build a dynamic understanding of culture. The issue then is how to refine the actor-centred perspective Geertz suggested so as to grasp change by taking into account both the discursive and the practical dimension of culture. In order to do so, I draw upon ideas that have been put forward by sociologists and political scientists in the debate about how to account for cultural references, notably Ann Swidler's argument that actors use culture as a set of tools to construct their strategies of action. My case study approaches security culture as an element of a security community, a stable zone of peace where threats or the use of force are no longer even considered possible among the actors involved, however important their disagreements might be. I am specifically studying the North Atlantic security community and the transformation of the security culture in this framework, as highlighted for example by the debate on a new strategic concept for NATO. My argument is that among the participants in the community, there are currently considerable divergences as concerns a common identification and assessment of threats and a shared understanding of what should be done about them. This gap proves difficult to bridge in the North Atlantic case, all the more since at the same time, elements of a specifically European security culture have emerged, at least in the form of a shared understanding about the use of force by the European Union and the importance of the military element in its external action. This context fits Swidler's description of an "unsettled" situation in which actors rely on cultural references for their new strategies of action. In the case of the North Atlantic security community and the emergence of a specific European understanding of the international environment and its threats, the question then is what "tools" from the "cultural kit" actors are using and how this transforms the frameworks of security culture.

The West – A Securitizing Community

Benjamin Herborth, University of Frankfurt/Main

Christian Weber, University of Frankfurt/Main

Gunther Hellmann, University of Frankfurt/Main

Abstract: The notion of “the West” pervades in political discourse. Yet, it still does stand in need of conceptual clarification. How can we theorize the West in a manner that does not presuppose a fixed understanding of the West as a pre-constituted political space, but rather establishes it as part of an open research question? Recent observations of a widening rift in transatlantic relations suggest that the question not only applies to relations between “the West and the rest” but also to intra-Western dynamics. Grasping the increasingly conflictive nature of, for instance, transatlantic relations in terms of the inherent contestedness of the West may thus offer a dual benefit. It not only helps to shed light on the underlying dynamics of such conflicts, it also helps to better understand how the problem of the West is represented inside Western political discourse. The paper thus will elaborate how the West is invoked in political discourses, how use of this signifier alters and what kind of political consequences probably arise from the securitizing West”.

The Puzzle of Transatlantic Relations – A Theory

Pertti Joenniemi, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)

Abstract: The paper probes the relationship between IR-theories and way the transatlantic Self has been discursively constructed over time. A major bulk of these theories has clearly sided with discourses premised on statist relations and with security-as-violence as a core constitutive argument. Moreover, there has been a clear distinction between Self and Other with similarity then posited inside and difference outside the relationship. With Self and Other seen as mutually exclusive categories, there has been little reason to pursue questions pertaining to ontological security as the introduction of the division already tends to settle that question and assumedly brings about durable self-certainty.

However, rather than equating difference with threat and to view it as something external to the relationship, there is also the option of regarding difference as something internal as well as complementary and positive in nature. Such an internal difference, allowing then also for categories that are simultaneously other and like to come into view, could actually underpin the relationship rather than rupture the transatlantic order as assumed by mainstream

theorization. It would also place ontological security at the core of the constellation instead of directing attention almost exclusively towards issues related to material and physical security.

Making explicit the latter type of theorizing would provide further credence to discourses pertaining to transatlantic bonds that have usually been marginalized with the help of mainstream IR-theory, and such a move will possibly also shed light into why mainstream theory has increasingly been compelled to approach the transatlantic configuration as something of a 'puzzle'.

"My father died for a good cause down there ..." - Popular Culture Discourse on Germany's Responsibility to Protect Afghanistan

Stefan Engelkamp, University of Münster

Philipp Offermann, University of Frankfurt/Main

Abstract: In 2001, Afghanistan became a threat to Germany. This perception, this act of 'writing security' shows in a strong Bundeswehr involvement in the ISAF and OEF missions. This involvement is special, given the non-interventionist history and identity of the Federal Republic. Today, this identity conflict is reflected in a fierce and multi-faceted discourse on the German mission in Afghanistan. This paper looks into representations of Germany's involvement in Afghanistan in recent German TV films. Taking up the war as a contested discursive site, these films reflect on and establish the ritual entanglement of peace at home and war abroad. On this fictional micro-level, German soldiers have to come to terms with both their actions and experiences. This struggle portrays the soldier as 'perpetrator and victim in one' (ZEHFUSS 2004) and is represented metaphorically as a conflict of generations: The young accept their responsibility to go to war in order to bring stability, fight terrorism and 'save brown women from brown men' (SPIVAK 1988). We argue that these popular culture texts are framed by Orientalist discourses which provide seemingly clear-cut distinctions between self and other. By drawing on such stereotypes, the German military deployment can be represented as a 'just' war, an act of responsibility. This is of crucial political importance: as Orientalist discourses grant the use of military violence political legitimacy, Germany can reconcile itself with its past and with the current war.

Panel 36-5: Changing Coalitions and Practices in a New Security Environment

Chair(s)	Anja P. Jakobi	Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK)
Discussant(s)	Elke Krahmman	University of Bristol

In the last decade, security studies have witnessed a large-scale change in the very definition of what constitutes a security threat: Today, security threats can be organized crime, terrorism, environmental change or industrial espionage. As a consequence, formerly highly relevant concepts as deterrence or comparable state-based concepts of security are increasingly rendered meaningless given newly defined and multifaceted challenges. These challenges also bring about several developments inducing individuals and organizations to reconsider what has to be perceived as a security problem and how these problems might be resolved organizationally. The panel discusses two partly interrelated developments linked to these challenges: Firstly, states increasingly engage non-state actors to deal with these new security problems. This results in new forms of public-private interplay on different levels of the political sphere, such as the inclusion of non-state actors in fighting corruption or multi-stakeholder initiatives to tackle environmental degradation. Second, the scope of security policy is broadened and the agendas of other sectors are merged with strategies of security policy, e.g. security policy, policing or development cooperation can go together tackling these new security threats. The panel assesses these changes from empirical and theoretical perspectives, clustered around the questions of a) how and on what conditions interorganizational exchange and cooperation takes place and b) how and with which consequences different realms of security are merged (e.g. state security and individual security, public and private security). The panel presents four papers that are related to these questions, starting with an organization study of a Swedish bank that has been subjected to anti-money-laundering measures, being forced to introduce new forms of risk assessment and control (Svedberg Helgesson). The second paper enlarges this picture by comparing two business sectors that are concretely threatened by violent conflict in their surrounding. It shows how the organizations respond differently to these challenges (Fischer). The third paper critically examines the development of non-state actors in security governance over time, arguing that not all practices of security governance have changed, but that the specific context and the idea of security is flexible (Hönke). The fourth and final paper systematically compares alliances with non-state actors concerning a new security threat – transnational organized

crime. It shows that some fields are more prone to active roles of non-state actors in governance, while others are more likely to leave only passive roles for these (Jakobi). In sum, the panel offers a new and original perspective in the rise of new security definitions, threats and actors – representing developments that are likely to impact widely on traditional notions of security.

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Privatization Coalitions, Strategic Decisions and Ideational Discourses: The Use of Private Military and Security Companies in Zones of Conflict

Andreas Kruck, University of Munich

Abstract: This paper suggests to analyze the transformation of security governance, reflected e.g. in the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in zones of conflict, as strategic decisions brought about by powerful public-private privatization coalitions which necessarily operate within and at the same time shape ideational discourses about “proper” modes of postmodern security governance. In the past two decades, “public” state actors even from strong western OECD states have increasingly delegated or outsourced the provision of security governance to private military and security companies (PMSCs), thus contributing to a privatization and commercialization of security. This paper seeks to both systematize and advance the theoretical debate on the reasons for, and implications of, the use of PMSCs in zones of conflict. Drawing on a flourishing literature, the paper introduces three different scholarly accounts of the use of PMSCs, i.e. privatization and commercialization as functional problem-driven phenomena, privatization and commercialization as phenomena driven by governments’ concerns to reduce political (rather than economic) costs, and privatization and commercialization as ideology-driven and inherently discursive phenomena. Rather than assessing the relative value of these competing approaches, the paper uses these re-constructed frameworks as wells as empirical (case-study) evidence to explore the possibilities for a more synthetic theoretical approach to the transformation of security governance which conceives of the use of PMSCs as strategic decisions attributable to powerful public-private privatization coalitions that are shaped by, and are shaping broader macro-ideational discourses about “proper” modes of postmodern security governance.

Rivalry or Partnership? Humanitarian Organizations and Private Military and Security Companies

Andrea Schneiker, University of Hannover

Abstract: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) increasingly invade the space of humanitarian organizations. Not only do they present themselves as “new humanitarians” who can assist the most vulnerable people in conflict-ridden areas and make the world a better, safer and healthier place, but they also play a more prominent role in the field itself. They either deliver humanitarian services themselves or provide security for the staff of humanitarian organizations which are confronted with complex emergencies and ever-more dangerous missions. The growing involvement of PMSCs is not without problems. It challenges the monopoly thus far enjoyed by non-profit organizations with respect to humanitarian assistance and calls into questions the triade of principles—neutrality, independence, and impartiality--which guides their actions. Drawing on both the framing literature as well as that regarding private-public partnerships, this paper examines how non-governmental organizations in the United States and in Great Britain, where most of the PMSCs are headquartered, react to private companies crowding their domain.

From FATF to FOREX: Translating Transnational Regulation in Financial Services

Karin S. Helgesson, Stockholm School of Economics

Abstract: National and transnational regulation is increasingly being characterized by a multitude of regulators, and the intertwining of hard law and soft. Boundary blurring is further evident in that sectors borrow goal, organizing principles and steering mechanisms from each other. The field of anti-money laundering (AML) constitutes an illustrative example of these developments. Previously a crime to be managed on the national level, money laundering, activities directed towards hiding the illicit sources of the proceeds of crime, has turned into a problem on the international agenda. Moreover, the role of the private sector is taking on new dimensions. Traditionally, private actors, in particular within the financial services industry, have an established role in crime prevention. Currently, however, the pressure on these and other business actors to take on “policing” tasks is expanding. This raises questions of accountability, transparency and the balancing of values and interests. Within the field of AML, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an important promulgator of best practices. The aim of the present paper is to discuss the impact of FATF with regard to some issues of boundary blurring. The paper analyses how FATF rules are translated into local business practices. The main question asked is how standardized

rules and knowledge are being translated into local rules and knowledge to be used in AML efforts in the business of every-day, including the question of which forms of friction arise during that process, and how possible conflicts of values and interests are being managed. Recent recommendations of FATF, reproduced in the 3rd EU Directive and national legislation, include ideas of closer co-operation between public and private parties. It further emphasizes the merits of risk management in terms of a “risk-based approach”. One finding of the present study is that proposed “risks” of the risk-based approach promoted by FATF are indeed becoming embedded in local rules, though in translated and edited form. Another finding was that translation was infused with friction. In part, friction arose as a result of the risk-based approach being set in relation to alternative and co-existing definitions of risk in the local setting such financial, operational and reputational risk. Another source of friction was related to the public-private divide, and the extent to which “true” compliance necessitated a renegotiation of boundaries between the two sectors. Empirically, the paper draws on a study of AML in Sweden. It is based on interviews with public and private officials, as well as on document studies. In particular, the paper discusses the implementation of proper AML procedures at the Forex Bank, an institution that was heavily fined by the Swedish Financial Services Authority in 2008 for not being compliant with AML regulation. Since then, Forex has made major efforts to introduce a new governance structure for AML in line

The Role of Non-state Actors in New Security Threats. Private Governance and Transnational Organized Crime

Anja P. Jakobi, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSFK)

Abstract: Transnational organized crime like piracy, human trafficking or money laundering has risen high on national and international agendas. In this context, crime has been defined as a new security threat in two different ways: On the one hand, criminal actors are non-state actors which are now debated as threat to states – prominently displayed in terms like ‘war against drugs’ or ‘war against terror’. On the other, crime is seen as a threat not only to state security but also to human security. As a consequence, global crime governance has become increasingly common and continuously enlarged: Several international organizations have turned to criminalize activities, monitor procedures of national compliance or establish mechanisms for regular exchange, for example OECD, FATF, UN or the G8. In this context, cooperation with private actors has become increasingly important, for example banks or activists from Transparency International. Analyzing the different roles of non-state actors in global crime governance, this paper sheds light on the relation of the global crime

agenda and non-state actors. By comparing different fields of crime governance, the paper shows that non-state actors sometimes play more active roles – like promoting regulations – but are sometimes reduced to passive role – for example when being conceived as implementation body only. These roles differ widely across fields. The paper is structured as follows: After a short introduction to global crime governance, I develop a framework that considers different roles for non-state actors, ranging from executive and monitoring functions to lobbying and norm emergence. In a second step, I present case studies of engagement of non-state actors in crime governance, namely piracy, human trafficking and smuggling, corruption and money laundering. In a third step, I compare these activities against the framework and across cases, to look in which areas which kind of non-state activity can be found. In sum, the paper shows that – parallel to the national level – also global crime governance is increasingly coined by the aid of non-state actors, constituting new alliances against a perceived common threat.

Hybrid Security Cultures in the 19th and 21st Century - Governing Security in Transnational Business Enclaves

Jana Hönke, Free University of Berlin

Abstract: Scholars in IR security studies and in criminology have discussed the privatization of security governance going along with the hybridization of public and private actors as a new phenomenon since the 1990s. In liberal policy and academic debates of (global) governance, these developments are understood as a move towards new modes of governance that work through the cooperation and coordination between public and private actors and may contribute to the effective provision of collective goods in the context of limited and transforming statehood. Concerning the role of multinational enterprises in the global South, companies are being represented as new partners in diffusing transnational norms and good governance to ‘zones of weak governance’ (OECD 2006, VPs). Comparing the role of business in security across different periods of time, I argue that neither actor constellations nor privatization as such are new, but rather political rationalities of governing security have changed leading to historically particular modes of security governance. The new regime of security practices is not purely liberal. Instead, it is characterized by a hybridity of discourses and practices that are to persist. I will illustrate this argument by comparing the security practices of multinational companies in African mining enclaves in the period before and after Westphalian statehood has been perceived as being the major structuring principle of African politics, namely the early colonial period 1886-1930, and the post-Cold

War period since 1990. I conclude that two cultures of security governance can be described in which business and commercial logics play a central role. Both are characterized by public-private hybridity and a broad understanding of security issues. Yet they are distinct with regard to the perception of security issues and the modes and practices of addressing insecurity.

Panel 36-6: Of Chickens and Eggs: Regions as Creators and Subjects of International Norms

Chair(s)	Theresa S. Reinold	University of Frankfurt/Main
Discussant(s)	Charlotte Dany	University of Frankfurt/Main

Regional security cultures are dynamic artifacts of human practice that are constantly evolving as the local, regional, and global normative contexts change. The culture of regional security is the result of a peculiar blend of factors from various levels of analysis: local customs, an emerging sense of regional identity, and evolving global norms of human security, sovereign responsibilities, good governance, etc. The interplay of these variables has given rise to markedly diverse security cultures in different regions of the world, ranging from rather interventionist regimes, which have eagerly incorporated evolving global norms into their regional security architecture (the African Union, for example), to more inert arrangements, which continue to adhere to the classical rules of the international game (such as ASEAN). This panel invites both conceptual and empirical contributions exploring the interaction between regional security cultures and global norms. Contributions are welcome that deal with security cultures as dependent as well as independent variables, i.e. papers distilling the factors that shape regional security cultures but also pieces exploring the feedback loop between the regional and the global level. Regional actors do not simply reject or accept new global norms, but more often than not adapt these norms to local circumstances by „pruning“ them, i.e. modifying them to make them more responsive to the local context. These processes of “norm localization” then feed back onto the global level. Regional actors are thus not passive addressees of international norms, but take on a creative role as agents of normative change on the global stage – they are simultaneously creators and subjects of international norms.

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Benchmarking European Security Culture?

Isabel F. Nunes, University of Groningen

Abstract: The paper will examine how particular misconceptions regarding the European security project impairs the understanding of European security culture. This will be based

on a selective review of the academic debate on European security culture, on relevant European Union's official sources and on the discussions found in policy oriented reports. On the second part it elaborates on the acknowledgement of competitive advantage of the EU goals and strategies to the demands of the current security environment.

Social Constructivist Comparative Study of Security Communities: EU, ASEAN and Pak-India Security Communities

Muhammad Shoaib Pervez, Leiden University

Abstract: It is an exploratory and interpretive comparative study of three security communities, EU, ASEAN and India-Pakistan security communities. It argues the presence of a normative structure underlying all three security communities. The exploration of this normative structure is based on distinct regional norms starting with "Judeo-Christian" in Europe (EU), 'ASEAN way' in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) and Indo-Pakistan popular culture in India Pakistan security community. This normative structure works at the hind set by formulating regional interests and identity. Furthermore, it seeks relevance for questions of states' identity and community norms' salience by juxtaposition of EU with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian nations) and Pak-India security communities. The idea is to study all three in a structured focus comparison for empirical generalizations. Has EU so far been successful in socializing member states for collective identity of Europeanization? Do European norms exist in European member states societies? Is there enough normative ground or geo-strategic compulsions in other regions notably in Asia to emulate this experiment? The paper will further explain the ASEAN unique way of grappling with the idea of security community in Southeast Asia. The cultural connotation of 'ASEAN way' is deeply embedded in the local social milieu of member states. The skepticism over the working of ASEAN as a security community has its answer in this cultural context. In the third part the paper will finally deal with an abstract security community in South Asia between India and Pakistan. The final argument will draw the conclusion that security community is a 'context' bounded construct and its replication in other parts is a delusion. However, there is also the presence of a latent normative structure in all three security communities. Though the paper is not exclusively on European Union yet the sociological arguments of a European identity carries insights by providing a recipe for other regions of the world where there is pressing need for such an experiment.

Regional Security and Global Norms in South America and Southeast Asia: A Cross-Regional Perspective on Processes of Interaction

Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, German Institute of Global and Area Studies

Abstract: Speaking of security can be a political act with significant consequences for citizens, states and regions. Security itself is also a basic need that decision makers (must) seek to satisfy. Different groups tend to think differently about security though. Concepts of security - what security is and how it is to be provided - are shaped by specific views on threats posed to a state, the ability of the state to deal with them, identity and view of the state's role in the world, power potential and historical lessons. In addition, global norms act as impact factor. Discourse on security illustrates these ideas and norms, but also strengthens, weakens or adapts and reconnects them. Over the past years, transnational threats have increasingly entered discourse on security and states have recognized these threats as shared concerns. One of the impetuses of rising transnational threats is thus the need for increased multilateral cooperation in the provision of security, also on a regional level. But cooperation and governance may be hindered by a number of factors, among them diverging ideas on the nature of threats and the means to effectively counter them. When considering regional security efforts, important questions arise: How is security thought and conceived of in the face of current transnational threats? What are the elements making up the discourse on security? What is the degree of a regional security culture? Which global norms are being reflected or also modified in regional security cultures? To answer these questions, the regions of South America and Southeast Asia will serve as cases. Due to the size of these regions, a comparison at the institutional level within each region is the most feasible. The paper will thus contribute to the current debate on security by an innovative cross-regional comparison, which also takes into account the often under-examined factor of security culture at the regional level.

European Security Culture

Matthias Dembinski, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF/HSE)

Abstract: The paper explores the development of a distinct European security culture by focusing on two issues: a) the emergence of the European Code-of-Conduct on arms exports, and b) the emergence of an EU culture of intervention. The paper discusses how interactions between global, regional, and local actors shaped European policies in these areas.

Climate Change as Driver of Security Policy

Michael Brzoska, University of Hamburg

Abstract: Based on earlier work analysing the diverse ways in which climate change was framed as a security issues in a number of reports published in 2007/2008, I will relate these intellectual efforts to debates and decisions in the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations. I will ask which effects the discourse on climate change has had on the readings of security challenges and directives for security policy in these organisation. My hypothesis is that the discourse on climate change further dilutes the current normative basis of international security-related policies.

Panel 36-7: A Question of Socio-cultural Context: Security Culture(s), Audiences and the Acceptance of Security Measures in Public Space

Chair(s)	Carlo Masala	Bundeswehr University of Munich
Discussant(s)	Christopher Daase	University of Frankfurt/Main

In the light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks states have sought to increase perceived security by developing new, expanding existing and implementing state-of-the-art security measures. After terrorist attacks in Madrid and London regional and international efforts to establish a standardized and broadly accepted security culture can be observed. Such attempts of standardization can be witnessed in the adoption and implementation of national, regional as well as international security measures affecting the daily lives of citizens in Western societies. Moreover body scanners, biometric databases and camera surveillance systems – amongst other measures – dominate public awareness and societal discussions about security in the Western hemisphere. Although regional efforts of standardization can be seen as a roadmap towards the establishment of an internationally accepted security culture, national differences in implementation and diverse public support or opposition for specific security measures highlight the existence of multiple security cultures varying on the basis of regional or national parameters. In practice, public approval and denial varies within European states even when considering one and the same security measure. While public opposition in Great Britain, as a country with a long-lasting liberal tradition mphasizing individual rights and with a dense net CCTV-cameras in Europe, almost tends to zero, a considerably small number of CCTV-cameras in Greece led to a public outrage culminating in the destruction of almost half the CCTV-cameras installed in public spaces. This example of differences in public acceptance raise academic awareness over the necessity to analyze cul-

tural, political, sociological, historical and judicial contexts of European societies and the effects of such socio-cultural indicators on the acceptance or rejection of security measures in public space. The panel emphasizes that socio-cultural differences and indicators shape public perception towards contemporary threats, risks and dangers, affect their evaluation and influence emerging security culture(s) in European societies. The core assumption put forward is that the influence of socio-cultural indicators, that are often multi-leveled and interlinked, can explain public acceptance or rejection of security measures in public space.

Papers

Human Securitization: State Theory, Governmentality, and the Ambivalence of Security in Europe

Andreas Vasilache, University of Bielefeld

Abstract: When discussing the conceptual shortcomings of human security with an empirical focus on Europe, we see that within stable, lawful democratic political contexts, these shortcomings in sum pose, on the one hand, mainly normative problems of an overall securitization and expanding executive governmentality of the political space in general. Quite remarkably, mainly normative arguments can and have to be brought forward against the human security concept, which is rooted in the liberal, idealistic tradition of IR and clearly expresses ethical objectives. On the other hand, these shortcomings tend to undermine targets such as certainty, predictability, stability, and freedom from fear, which are essential for both the notion of security in general and the concept of human security in particular.

Is Security Culture Really Being Transformed? A Re-examination of the Theory of Securitization and Its Underlying Psychological Processes

Johanna Lütterfelds, University of Vienna

Abstract: The question of the panel “The Transformation of Security Culture” for this year’s SGIR conference on IR, whether there is taking place a foundational change within the (international) security culture, has been a prominent one within the study of IR since the end of the cold war. As has been laid out in the outline of this panel many new trends and tendencies can be observed. For example new technological developments, the raise of non-state actors (may that be international organizations, international terrorists, and so on), economization of security and globalization are leaving deep traces in the way security culture is being shaped, there is no doubt about that. So on some level there clearly is a change

in / transformation of security culture in general. But the point I want to make in my paper is the following: this is nothing new. Security culture has forever been changing, whether on macro- or on micro-level, throughout every existing society. There have always been new challenges and threats, new technologies, new constellations of involved actors and so on. So the transformations being described by this panel can be identified as merely being superficial. As this sounds quite drastic we need to step back one step and look at the core problem that underlies every prevailing security culture: the concept of security and how it can and actually is being used by certain actors in order to achieve some or another (political) gain. The theory of securitization comes to mind (Buzan et al.). What this theory is saying is that certain actors can - through specific speech acts – use the concept of security in order to achieve a state of emergency that in turn enables them to use emergency measures that are outside of the frame of “normal politics”. When for example looking closely at the occurrences surrounding the war against Iraq in the USA in the year 2003 it seems that the theory of securitization captured an underlying tendency that is not uncommon in political processes (Lütterfelds, 2008). What it leaves out though, is the following question: what is it about human behaviour / psyche that makes all this possible? The answer to this question lies in mass psychology, as described by Sigmund Freud, and the pyramid of needs, as described by Abraham Maslow. Apparently there is a thrive for security that - in certain situations - overlaps everything, especially rational arguments and deliberations, a fact that can and has been taken advantage of by specific actors throughout the history of mankind. To sum up: this underlying tendency has not changed and certainly will not change in the future. This is what we should analyze and further look at, especially in a time, when the current security culture is being changed in the direction of more and more intransparency and complexity. Because this changing framework could make it possible for actors other than the designated political and (inter-)national actors to actively abuse this psychological structuredness for their (personal) gains.

Disentangling Concepts of Risk and Security: Socializing Politics or Politicizing Society?

Florian P. Kuehn, University of Hamburg

Abstract: Research on risk has grown along with a general acceptance of risks as central feature of international relations. This is, as some argue, due to increasing connections between societal strata and economic interaction, coined under the idea of ‘globalization’. With technology shaping the terms of modern life, risks emanating from this way of life

tend to be solved by even more technology. Others see risks as socially constructed and hence as always political. Both views understate how risks can be used in the political sphere to deflect political responsibility and hence depoliticise certain issues. Three hypotheses follow this diagnosis: First, the level of technology states have achieved influences their risk perception. This fosters cooperation of technologically advanced states, resulting in a loosely formed security community. While the security community requires commitment to be upheld, different levels of institutionalization are possible. This cooperative umbrella, however, still leaves states fragmented and leads to diverging security perceptions and increasingly different risk policy. Second, as non-state actors gain relevance within and outside the security community, how they are perceived becomes a factor in international relations itself: Their existence questions the prevalent norm of statehood and demands an answer of states, as organizations lacking state containment tend to be seen as risky for international arrangements. Sticking to a distinction between legal and illegal, thus reinforcing the ideal of statehood, risks are evaluated along the lines of formal and informal, the latter being included into security considerations. For agencies outside the formal state paradigm, states themselves may be a risk, as states reach out to transform modes of social interaction into officially manageable paths. Third, as security became individualized over the last couple of years, so have risk perceptions. From state building in failed states to health care in the USA, the relation between individuals and the overarching social institutions are discussed with reference to risk. Accordingly, the gap between the overarching risk discourse and the organizational tools of states, but also other societal actors needs to be analytically framed. This paper aims to develop a research agenda to include these seemingly contradictory factors. It connects sociological and institutional readings of risk and aims to get away from the state while not disregarding it as reference: While the politics of risk are manifested mainly within the powerful regulative potential of the state, they stretch well beyond state boundaries, transcending societies, economic and, increasingly, security relations.